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Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001 v. NLRB (Safeco Title Insurance 
Co.): Extending Tree Fruits to Protect Picketing of Predominant 
Product Secondaries 
The consumer product boycott is a traditional weapon employed 
by organized labor in disputes with employers. Picketing to solicit sup-
port from the public and other workers is also a traditional labor tactic. 
The legality of seeking support by combining these two methods-
picketing a retailer to urge a consumer boycott of the primary em-
ployer's product1-has been a source of disagreement among the 
Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, and the National Labor Relations Board. The contested is-
sue is whether picketing to instigate a product boycott on the premises 
of an employer with whom the union has no dispute-the secondary 
employer2-violates section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA), which prohibits threatening, coercing, or restraining 
any employer in order to force that employer to stop doing business 
with any other person.3 Read literally, the statute would prohibit any 
product picketing at a secondary site. The Supreme Court in NLRB v. 
Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 700 (Tree Fruits)4 has held, however, 
that product picketing does not threaten, restrain, or coerce the retailer 
if the picketing requests only that consumers not purchase the struck 
product and does not ask them to boycott the secondary employer alto-
gether. 5 
In Tree Fruits, the struck product accounted for only a small por-
tion of the sales of the grocery stores picketed by the union. Many 
retailers, however, sell primarily or only the product or products of one 
employer, and both unions and employers have significant interests in 
the legality of consumer product picketing under such circumstances. 
I The primary employer is the employer with whom the union has a dispute. 
2 C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 604 (1971). 
3 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976). The statute specifically prchibits threatening, re-
straining, or coercing a person to force that person to cease doing business with any other person. 
The statute refers to "persons" rather than "employers" because "employers" as defined by the 
NLRA excludes, inter alia, railroads and public employers. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976). 
4 377 U.S. 58 (1964). 
5 The statute has never been read literally since a literal reading would prevent even primary 
strikes. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); NLRB v. International Rice 
Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951). 
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Picketing at the premises of the sole product seller is an efficient and 
effective means by which a union can pressure the primary employer. 
Yet, an effective picket may cause severe economic injury to the secon-
dary, who may have little or no power to settle the dispute. 
Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001 (Sefeco Title Insurance 
Co.) v. NLRB6 addresses the issue of the legality of consumer product 
picketing where the primary's product constitutes a substantial portion 
of the secondary's business. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia, sitting en bane, held that, regardless of the 
amount of the secondary's business the struck product represented, 
picketing the premises of a secondary employer to request consumers to 
boycott a product of a primary employer was legal if the boycott re-
quested was limited to the struck product. The court reasoned that 
such picketing was primary in character since it did not expand the 
dispute beyond the primary's product, and was therefore legal. The 
court reversed the National Labor Relations Board7 and a three-judge 
panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 8 both of 
which had held that such picketing violated the NLRA because the 
union used unlawful means to achieve the unlawful object of forcing 
the secondary to cease doing business with the primary employer. The 
Board had inferred that object from the predictable impact of effective 
picketing: a total boycott that would coerce the secondary to stop trad-
ing with the primary so as to avoid the economic ruin a successful pick-
et would cause. 
Although Tree Fruits contains language that supports both the 
Board and the en bane court in Sefeco, a close analysis of the court's 
decision and its underlying policies indicates that the court's interpreta-
tion is more consistent with the Tree Fruits rationale. The Board's ap-
proach, of determining legality according to the impact of the picketing 
on the secondary, has several flaws: it is speculative,9 fails to provide a 
clear standard for decisionmaking10 and is at odds with the approach of 
the Board in other secondary boycott cases. 11 The court's approach, 
unlike the Board's, is consistent with other secondary boycott cases12 
and offers a clear, workable standard for determining legality based on 
objective factors. 13 Furthermore, the court strikes an appropriate bal-
6 101 L.R.R.M. 3084, (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en bane) cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3426 (U.S. Jan. 8, 
1980) (No. 79-672) [hereinafter cited as Safeco Title Ins.]. The decision followed a rehearing en 
bane and reversed a panel's prior decision in Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, 99 
L.L.R.M. 3330 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
7 Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, 226 N.L.R.B. 754 (1976). 
8 Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, 99 L.R.R.M. 3330 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
9 See text accompanying notes 88-95 i'!fra. 
IO See text accompanying notes 96-100 i'!fra. 
11 See text accompanying notes 86-87 i'!fra. 
12 See text accompanying notes 101-20 i'!fra. 
13 See text accompanying notes 106-10 ·liyra. 
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ance between the interests of the secondary employer and those of the 
union, 14 in accordance with the realities of modern industrial rela-
tions.15 
THE FACTUAL SETTING OF SAFECO 
The Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, Retail Clerks In-
ternational Association, AFL-CIO, represented the employees of 
Safeco Title Insurance Company in the collective bargaining process. 
After the parties reached an impasse in contract negotiations, the union 
struck Safeco. 16 To gain support for their strike, union members pick-
eted the premises of five land title companies that sold Safeco poli-
cies.17 The picket signs read: SAFECO NONUNION DOES NOT 
EMPLOY MEMBERS OF OR HAVE CONTRACT WITH RETAIL 
STORE EMPLOYEES LOCAL 1001. In addition to picketing, the 
union distributed handbills asking Safeco policyholders to support the 
strike by cancelling their insurance. The title companies experienced 
no work stoppage or interference with deliveries as a result of the 
union's action. 18 
The picketed title companies derived ninety to ninety-five percent 
of their revenues from Safeco policies. 19 Although Safeco was a sub-
stantial stockholder in each company (and a majority stockholder in 
one company),20 it did not control the labor relations policies or other 
day-to-day operations of any of the companies.21 Neither was there 
any interchange of employees between Safeco and the title compa-
nies. 22 
In charges filed with the National Labor Relations Board, Safeco 
and one of the title companies alleged that the union's picketing of the 
title companies violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor 
Relations Act. 23 The statute provides: 
14 See text accompanying notes 127-34 itifi-a. 
15 See text accompanying notes 136-41 itifi-a. 
16 The union was certified as collective bargaining representative of the Safeco employees in 
July 1974. Negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement began, and an impasse was reached 
in November 1974. Safeco Title Ins., IOI L.R.R.M. at 3085. 
17 Striking employees picketed at each of the five companies on various dates between Febru-
ary 19, 1975 and April 15, 1975. 226 N.L.R.B. at 755. 
18 Safeco Title Ins., IOI L.R.R.M. at 3085. 
19 Title searches and escrow services provided the remainder of the revenue. 226 N.L.R.B. at 
755. 
20 The percentage of stock owned by Safeco in the various title companies was 12%, 20%, 28%, 
38%, and 53%. Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976). The charges also alleged that the union violated 29 
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(B), which provides that it is an unfair labor practice for a union 
to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in 
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, ·a strike or a refusal in the 
972 
74:970 (1980) Safeco Title Insurance Co. 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(4) ... (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in com-
merce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object 
thereof is-
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, han-
dling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any 
other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing busi-
ness with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other em-
ployer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the 
representative of his employees unless such labor organization has 
been certified as the representative of such employees under the 
provisions of section 159 of this title: Provided, That nothing con-
tained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, 
where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary pick-
eting; ... 24 
After determining that the title companies were neutral employers 
with regard to the dispute between Safeco and the union,25 the Board 
held that Tree Fruits, which held that consumer picketing at the secon-
dary's premises is lawful where limited to the struck product, was not 
applicable to Safeco where the predictable result of successful picketing 
would be a complete boycott of the neutral employer. The Board rea-
soned that since Safeco products constituted such a large portion of the 
title companies' business, a request for a boycott of the product was, in 
effect, a request for a total boycott of the neutrals. Because the predict-
able result of the picketing was a total boycott, the Board found that 
the union had an objective that violates section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B): forcing 
course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or 
work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; . . . 
Id. The Board declined to rule on the§ 8(b)(4)(i)(B) allegation because neither the complaint nor 
the briefs contained any facts or contentions to support the allegation. 226 N.L.R.B. at 757 n.16. 
24 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976). 
25 Employers who are not neutral are allies of the primary employer, and the union can picket 
them in furtherance of the primary dispute without violating the NLRA. An employer may be an 
ally by virtue of performing struck work, NLRB v. Business Machines Local 459 (Royal Type-
writer), 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955), or because the primary and secondary are a single employer 
according to the Board's criteria for assessing neutrality. The Board weighs four factors in deter-
mining whether an employer is neutral: (I) common ownership; (2) common control of day-to-day 
operations, including labor relations; (3) integration of business operations; and (4) economic in-
terdependence. See NLRB v. Local 810, Steel & Hardware Fabricators (Sid Harvey), 460 F.2d I 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972); text accompanying notes 128-33 infra. 
The Board found that the title companies were neutral employers in the dispute between 
Safeco and the union. The Board based its finding of neutrality in Sqfeco primarily on the lack of 
common control of the labor relations and day-to-day operations of Safeco and the title compa-
nies. Although the title insurance companies were dependent economically on Safeco, the Board, 
relying on Local 14055, United Steelworkers (Dow Chem. Co), 211 N.L.R.B. 649 (1974), eeforce-
menl denied, 524 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), held that 
economic dependence alone was insufficient to warrant a finding of nonneutrality. 
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the secondary employer to cease doing business with the primary. The 
appeal was coercive because of the severity of the potential impact. 
A three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia, with Judge Robinson dissenting, upheld the 
Board's decision.26 After affirming the Board's finding that the land 
title companies were neutral,27 the panel found that the union's con-
duct violated the NLRA and the Tree Fruits prohibition against total 
boycotts. The panel reasoned that a boycott of the insurance policies 
was necessarily a boycott of the secondary's total business since the 
only other services the secondary offered were ancillary to the policies. 
The court supported its .finding with analogies to several integrated 
product cases. 28 In those cases, the Board and the courts had held that 
picketing a struck product was unlawful if the picket amounted to a 
total boycott of the secondary's business because the primary's product 
had become an integral part of the secondary's product, losing its sepa-
rate identity. 
Although it agreed with the Board and the panel on the neutrality 
of the title companies, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, sitting en bane, reversed the .finding that the picket-
ing was illegal. 29 According to the en bane court, the test of the legality 
26 Retail Store Employees Local 1001, 99 L.L.R.M. 3330 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd en bane, 101 
L.R.R.M. 3084 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The court refused to follow its earlier Dow decision that had 
upheld the legality of picketing limited to the product, but was later vacated by the Supreme 
Court. In Dow, the Board found that the union's picketing of several gasoline stations, pursuant 
to a dispute with the producer of the gasoline they sold, had an unlawful object because the 
request not to buy gasoline was, in effect, a request not to patronize the neutral gasoline station. 
Local 14055, United Steelworkers (Dow Chem. Co.), 2ll N.L.R.B. 649, 652 (1975), eeforcement 
denied, 524 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), dismissed as 
moot, 229 N.L.R.B. 302 (1977). The appellate court reversed, holding that the picketing was law-
ful so long as the boycott request was confined to the struck product. 524 F.2d at 861. The 
Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded to the Board for consideration of whether the 
issue was moot. 429 U.S. at 807. The Board dismissed the charge as moot since the union had 
dissolved during the pendency of the proceedings. 229 N.L.R.B. at 303. 
27 99 L.L.R.M. at 3331-32. 
28 Id. at 3333-34. See Cement Masons Union Local 337, 190 N.L.R.B. 261 (1971), eeforced, 
468 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973) (houses constructed by a primary 
being offered for sale by a secondary); Teamsters Local 327 (American Bread), 170 N.L.R.B. 91 
(1968), eeforced, 4ll F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1969) (bread supplied by the primary to the secondary's 
restaurant). See also Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37, 167 N.L.R.B. 1030 (1967), eeforced, 
401F.2d952 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (advertising by a secondary in a primary's newpaper). For a discus-
sion of the validity of the reliance on the integrated products cases, see text accompanying notes 
121-26 i'!fra. 
29 The court upheld the Board's determination that the title companies were neutral, finding 
that the Board had considered all the relevant factors and evaluated them according to the appro-
priate criteria. Safeco Title Ins., 101 L.L.R.M. at 3090-94. Since issues of neutrality involve com-
plex factual determinations, courts generally defer to the Board's expertise in the area unless its 
decision is contrary to law or unsupported by substantial evidence "on the record when viewed as 
a whole." See id. at 3087. See also Carpet Layers Local 419 v. NLRB, 467 F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir. 
1972). 
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of consumer picketing of a secondary established by the Supreme 
Court in Tree Fruits was whether the picketing is closely confined to 
the primary dispute. If not, the picketing coerces the secondary em-
ployer and violates section 8(b )( 4)(ii)(B). According to the en bane 
court's reading of Tree Fruits, picketing that is limited to requesting 
customers not to buy the struck product is confined closely to the pri-
mary dispute. Jn that case, a successful appeal to consumers would 
result in no greater loss of business than would be caused by a primary 
strike and therefore would be legal. 30 
The court rejected the argument, accepted by the Board and the 
dissent, that the predictable impact made the picketing coercive of the 
neutral employer. The court read Tree Fruits as a refusal to adopt the 
position that the test of coercion was the extent of the actual or poten-
tial economic impact on the secondary.31 The court noted further that 
its construction of the statute avoided possible first amendment 
problems.32 
In his dissent Judge Robb agreed with the Board that the foresee-
able effect of the picketing was a total boycott, one of the evils at which 
Congress had directed section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).33 According to Judge 
Robb, the legislative history of the 1959 amendments to section 8(b)(4) 
indicates that Congress intended to protect neutrals whose only product 
was that of the primary employer.34 Judge Robb would have limited 
Tree Fruits to situations where the struck product constituted only a 
small part of the secondary's business. 
30 101 L.R.R.M. at 3091. Although the Tree Fmils Court did not indicate specifically that 
picketing is primary if the impact is no greater than that of a successful primary strike, such a test 
has been suggested. Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycoll, 62 CoLUM. L. REV. 1363 
(1962). The Board has not explicitly adopted the test, however, and the en bane court used it to 
support its finding that the picketing was closely confined to the primary dispute, not as a test for 
primary character. Safeco Title Ins., 101 L.R.R.M. at 3091. Moreover, the test is not predictive of 
the character of picketing where the secondary derives its business almost exclusively from the 
primary's product since neither picketing the product nor picketing to stop all business causes 
consequences greater than those that would be caused by a successful primary strike. A successful 
primary strike would, in effect, cause a shutdown of the business as would successful product 
picketing or a successful appeal to cease patronage. 
31 Safeco Title Ins., 101 L.R.R.M. at 3090-91. 
32 The Tree Fmits Court had also alluded to first amendment issues to support its conclusion 
that Congress intended only a limited ban on peaceful picketing in 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 377 U.S. 58, 63 
(1964). The Sofeco court indicated that the Board's approach of inferring the intent of the union 
from the circumstances of the employer "enlivens the specter of constitutional infirmity." Safeco 
Title Ins., 101 L.R.R.M. at 3094. For further discussion of the first amendment issue, see notes 38, 
62-73 and accompanying text iefra. 
33 Safeco Title Ins., 101 L.R.R.M. at 3094 (Robb, J., dissenting). 
34 Id. at 3094-95. 
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THE PREVAILING INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 8(b)(4): 
TREE FRUITS 
An analysis of NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 700 (Tree 
Fruits)35 is essential to determine whether the Board or the en bane 
court applied the NLRA properly to the facts of Safeco. The union in 
Tree Fruits struck the Washington state fruit packers. The union pick-
eted a chain of Safeway stores and requested customers not to buy 
Washington apples, one of the many products sold by Safeway. No 
work stoppage resulted, and there was no interference with deliveries to 
Safeway grocery stores. Prior to Tree Fruits, the Board had interpreted 
the publicity proviso of section 8(b)(4) as prohibiting all consumer 
product picketing at secondary sites.36 Adhering to these earlier deci-
sions, it held that the picketing in Tree Fruits was a per se violation of 
the statute. 37 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
reversed the Board and held that the statutory prohibition of conduct 
that threatened, restrained, or coerced the employer required a finding 
that the secondary was actually threatened, restrained, or coerced. 
The United States Supreme Court rejected both the per se ap-
proach of the Board and the approach taken by the Court of Appeals. 
The Court concluded that in view of the history of limited congres-
sional regulation of picketing and the possible first amendment 
problems,38 it would not attribute to Congress an intention to prohibit 
peaceful picketing without the clearest indication in the legislative his-
tory. The Court found that consumer product picketing did not fall in 
the category of conduct that Congress intended to prohibit and, there-
fore, did not threaten, restrain, or coerce the secondary in violation of 
the statute. 39 The Court continued: 
35 377 U.S. 58 (1964). 
36 Upholsterers Frame & Bedding Workers Local No. 61, 132 N.L.R.B. 40 (1961). See note 46 
infra. 
37 132 N.L.R.B. 1172 (1961). After finding that the literal wording of the proviso prohibited 
consumer product picketing, the Board went on to state that such picketing threatened, restrained, 
or coerced the secondary, presumably inferring that Congress made that determination in passing 
the statute. The Board also inferred that the union intended the "natural and foreseeable result" 
of its picketing-that successful picketing would force Safeway, the secondary, to cease doing 
business with the struck employers, and therefore had an unlawful object. This approach, which 
was not adopted by the Supreme Court in Tree Fruits, is similar to the Board's approach in 
Safeco. 
38 The majority expressed a concern that a broad ban on picketing might violate the first 
amendment but did not analyze the first amendment issue in detail. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable 
Packers Local 700, 377 U.S. at 63. See also id. at 77-79 (Black, J ., concurring); text accompanying 
notes 62-66 infra. 
39 Professor Engel criticizes the Court's analysis, suggesting that the Court should determine 
whether the picketing threatens, restrains, or coerces the neutral before deciding whether the pick-
eting is prohibited by the statute. Engel, Secondary Consumer Picketing-Fol/owing the Struck 
Product, 52 VA. L. REV. 189, 196 (1966). Although the Court based its decision that the picketing 
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When consumer picketing is employed only to persuade customers not to 
buy the struck product, the union's appeal is closely confined to the pri-
mary dispute. The site of the appeal is expanded to include the premises 
of the secon~ary employer, but if the appeal succeeds, the secondary em-
ployer's purchases from the struck firms are decreased only because the 
public has diminished its purchases of the struck product. On the other 
hand, when consumer picketing is employed to persuade customers not to 
trade at all with the secondary employer, the latter stops buying the struck 
product, not because of a falling demand, but in response to pressure 
designed to inflict injury on his business generally. In such case, the 
union does more than merely follow the struck product; it creates a sepa-
rate dispute with the secondary employer.40 
The Legislative History 
The Tree Fruits majority engaged in an extensive analysis of the 
legislative history of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure 
Act of 1959,41 and found that it did not demonstrate a clear intent to 
ban consumer picketing necessitated by the potential first amendment 
problems. The Court stated that the sponsors of the amendments did 
not mention consumer product picketing as one of the abuses that the 
statute was intended to correct.42 Although opponents feared that the 
amendments would prohibit consumer product picketing, the Court re-
fused to rely on their statements because opponents often exaggerate 
the potential effects of a bill in order to increase the chances of its de-
feat.43 One of the sponsors had referred to consumer product picketing 
in the debates but indicated that it would be prohibited only if it 
"coerc[ed] the retailer not to do business with the manufacturer."44 
The Court did not read this statement as indicating a general prohibi-
tion on consumer product picketing. The Court also noted that where 
Congress intended to ban picketing completely, it did so specifically, as 
in section 8(b)(7).45 
According to the Court, the publicity proviso to section 8(b )( 4)46 
did not threaten, restrain, or coerce on its finding that Congress did not intend to prohibit the 
conduct in question, Professor Engel's suggested approach appears to be more consistent with 
good judicial practice and with the analysis used by the Board and courts in interpreting the -
statute. 
40 377 U.S. at 72. 
41 Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935. Both the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976), and the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 
29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976), amended the NLRA. 
42 377 U.S. at 65, 67. 
43 Id. at 66. 
44 Id. at 67-68. 
45 Id. at 68. Section 8 (b)(7) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organi-
zation or its agents- . . . to picket or cause to be picketed . . . any employer where an object 
thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization 
.... " 29 u.s.c. § 158(b)(7) (1976). 
46 The publicity proviso states: 
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did not indicate an intent to ban consumer picketing. Rather, the 
Court said, the proviso was inserted to ensure the constitutionality of 
the statute by allowing the use of publicity other than picketing to per-
suade customers to stop trading with the secondary employer.47 The 
Court based this finding on Senator Kennedy's interpretation of the 
proviso. Senator Kennedy had stated that the proviso preserved "the 
right to appeal to consumers by methods other than picketing by asking 
them to refrain froJTI buying goods made by nonunion labor and to 
refrain from trading with a retailer who sells such goods."48 The Court, 
emphasizing the "and," read the statement to indicate that the proviso 
banned only picketing designed to stop all trade with the secondary.49 
Based on this analysis, the Court concluded that Congress, in approv-
ing the amendments, prohibited "isolated evils" rather than peaceful 
picketing in general. so 
Commentators have criticized the majority's interpretation of the 
statute as contrary to the legislative history.s 1 It is argued that even 
though consumer picketing may not have been one of the problems 
that the sponsors of the amendments originally intended to correct, 
when opponents pointed out that the statute could be read to ban con-
sumer picketing, proponents did not repudiate that suggestion. s2 It is 
also suggested that the publicity provisos3 was a compromise that was 
the result of the assumption of both proponents and opponents that the 
amendments banned consumer product picketing.s4 According to crit-
ics, Senator Kennedy's statement about the proviso supports a literal 
reading rather than the strained reading suggested by the majority.ss 
In addition, other statements in the legislative history may be inter-
Provided.further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in such 
paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of 
truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization, 
that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization 
has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does 
not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary 
employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any 
goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such 
distribution .... 
29 u.s.c. § 158(b)(4) (1976). 
47 377 U.S. at 70. 
48 Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting 105 CONG. REC. 17,898-99 (1959)). 
49 Id. 
so Id. at 71. 
SI Lewis, Consumer Picketing and the Court-The Questionable Yield ef Tree Fruits, 49 MINN. 
L. REV. 479, 481 (1965). See also Comment, Product Picketing-A New Loophole in Section 
8(b)(4) efthe National Labor Relations Act?63 MICH. L. REV. 682, 686 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 
MICHIGAN Comment]. 
52 Lewis, supra note 51, at 499. See also MICHIGAN Comment, supra note 51, at 686. 
S3 See note 46 supra. 
S4 Lewis, supra note 51, at 499. 
5S Id. at 500. See also 377 U.S. at 87 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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preted to support a literal reading of the proviso.56 Critics also note 
that Congress did not recognize the distinction made by the Court be-
tween product picketing and picketing for a total boycott.57 
Although the criticisms of the majority's reading of the legislative 
history have some validity, the Court's interpretation of the congres-
sional intent can be supported. The legislative history indicates sub-
stantial confusion among members of Congress about the definition of 
a secondary boycott and what evils the statute was designed to remedy. 
In view of such confusion, individual remarks in prolonged legislative 
debates may not demonstrate clearly the intent of Congress.58 More-
over, the legislative history indicates that Congress intended prior case 
law, which permitted many types of secondary boycotts, to remain in 
effect.59 
Furthermore, the Court's interpretation effectuates the underlying 
purpose of the NLRA-to encourage collective bargaining and private 
resolution of labor disputes. 60 The narrow reading of the statute by the 
Tree Fruits Court protects neutrals from greater economic injury than 
declining sales of the primary's product, but it also permits the parties 
to use a wide range of economic weapons to resolve their dispute with 
minimal government interference. 
The Supreme Court has stated that the practice of construing a 
statute according to the spirit rather than the letter of the law is particu-
larly appropriate in the case of labor legislation that is: 
to a marked degree, the result of conflict and compromise between strong 
contending forces and deeply held views on the role of organized labor in 
the free economic life of the Nation and the appropriate balance to be 
struck between the uncontrolled power of management and labor to fur-
ther their respective interests. 6 I 
56 MICHIGAN Comment, supra note 51, at 687. The author cites several examples that were 
also cited by Justice Harlan in his dissent. Id. Senator Griffin's analysis of the conference agree-
ment indicated that it prohibited secondary consumer picketing at retail stores but permitted other 
publicity. 105 CONG. REC. 18,022 (1959). Congressman Thompson analyzed the conference 
agreement as permitting publicity, but not picketing, advertising the fact that an employer sold 
goods produced by a company involved in a labor dispute. 105 CONG. REC. 18,133 (1959). These 
statements and others cited by the author to support criticism of the majority's reading of the 
legislative history, like statements cited in Tree Fruits, can be discounted as statements of oppo-
nents, or interpreted as the Court interpreted Senator Kennedy's statement-as prohibiting only a 
total boycott. See text accompanying notes 48-49 supra. 
57 Note, Picketing and Publicity Under Section 8(b)(4) of the LMRA, 73 YALE L.J. 1265, 1275-
76 (1964). 
58 Engel, supra note 39, at 199. Professor Engel suggests that the Court should not rely on 
interpretations made by individual legislators during the debates, but should utilize its own inter-
pretive ability to determine the intent of Congress based on the legislative history as a whole. 
Furthermore, first amendment considerations justify the Court's requirement of a clear indication 
of congressional intent to ban all product picketing. See notes 70-73 and accompanying text i'!fra. 
59 Id. at 199-200. 
60 Id. at 200 n.38. 
61 National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 619 (1967), rehearing denied, 387 
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The "spirit" of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) was to protect true neutrals from 
becoming embroiled in the disputes of others while at the same time 
protecting labor's right to solicit support for its goals. Limiting picket-
ing to the product accords with this spirit and also avoids the restrictive 
literal reading that would ban picketing at the primary site. Thus, the 
complexity of the issues and the desire to effectuate the basic purposes 
of the NLRA warrant what at first may appear to be a somewhat 
strained reading of tQ.e legislative history by the Tree Fruits Court. 
First Amendment Considerations 
First amendment considerations, though not articulated clearly by 
the Tree Fruits Court, also support the Court's narrow reading of the 
statutory prohibition.62 The first amendment protects a union's right to 
publicize the facts of a labor dispute. 63 Because picketing involves both 
speech and action, it has impact beyond that attributable to the force of 
the constitutionally protected message on the signs. Therefore, the 
Court has permitted the government to effectuate valid government 
policies by imposing reasonable restrictions on picketing.64 Restric-
tions on picketing require a "review of the balance struck by a State 
between picketing that involves more than 'publicity' and competing 
interests of state policy."65 Thus, a decision regarding the constitution-
ality of a regulation or prohibition of picketing involves a balancing of 
the purposes for the prohibition with the right to picket. Complete 
bans are constitutionally impermissible.66 
In view of the case law, the Tree Fniits Court was correct in sens-
ing a potential conflict between the first amendment and section 
8(b )( 4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA. The prohibition is worded broadly, but the 
Court has indicated that even abuses of the right to picket in a particu-
lar situation do not justify a prohibition of all picketing.67 The spon-
U.S. 926 (1967) (quoting Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 
93, 99-100 (1958)). 
62 See note 38 supra. 
63 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). 
64 Building Serv. Employees Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 536-37 (1950). Policies that 
constitute reasonable bases for regulation of picketing include: (1) prevention of continued, un-
questionably false representations and coercive acts, Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 
U.S. 293, 295 (1943); (2) protection of property interests, Teamsters Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 
470 (1957); (3) prevention of wrongful interference with business by third parties, American Radio 
Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974); (4) prevention of picketing designed to coerce 
commission of unlawful acts, Givoney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); (5) 
prevention of violence, Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941); and (6) pre-
vention of coercion of employees in the choice of their bargaining representative, Teamsters Local 
695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957). These cases involved state laws to which the Court may have 
given more deference than to a federal law. 
65 Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 290 (1957). 
66 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103-05 (1940). 
67 Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 296 (1943). 
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sors of the amendments themselves stated that the prohibitions were 
limited by the constitutional right of free speech. 68 If the Court had 
read the statute broadly, it would have been necessary to evaluate the 
purposes of the legislation and balance them against the first amend-
ment interests.69 
While the outcome of the balancing process is not certain, for sev-
eral reasons the Court might strike the balance in favor of protecting 
the picketing by the first amendment. First, in some cases like Safeco, 
the union may not have an effective, alternative means of publicizing a 
labor dispute.70 Second, as Justice Black argued in his concurrence in 
Tree Fruits, a ban on all consumer product picketing would violate the 
first amendment because it would constitute a content restriction on 
speech.71 According to Justice Black, there are two significant aspects 
of picketing-patrolling and speech. Patrolling can be regulated in or-
der to protect significant governmental interests, such as public order, 
but the statute can be read broadly to prohibit patrolling. Furthermore 
the prohibition is content-related; it extends only to those who have a 
specific message-a request for a product boycott.72 Accordingly, the 
Court had a legitimate concern about possible first amendment 
problems that warranted its narrow construction of the statute.73 
Means-Object Analysis 
The Board and some courts have utilized a means-object test to 
determine the legality of picketing at locations other than the premises 
of the primary employer.74 Both an illegal means-threatening, re-
straining, or coercing the secondary employer-and an illegal object-
forcing the secondary to cease doing business with the primary-must 
be established to prove a violation. The Supreme Court in Tree Fruits 
68 See 105 CONG. Rec. 15,673 (1959). 
69 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). Cf. Note, United Steelworkers of America 
Local 14055 v. NLRB-Secondary Consumer Boycotts, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 579, 594-96 (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as DETROIT Note] (in view of subsequent law, there is no first amendment prob-
lem). See Comment, Product Picketing: The Secondary Boycott Provisions of the NLRA and the 
Tree Fruits and Dow Cases, 7 Tex. TECH. L. Rev. 645, 669-70 (1976), for an argument that the 
government's purpose is sufficient to permit regulation of the picketing. See Lewis, note 55 supra, 
for a discussion of the policies of statutory construction that the Court might have used in Tree 
Fruits. 
70 Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942); Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940). Handbilling may offer an alternative method of communication. 
It may be ineffective, however, when compared to picketing, the traditional sign of a labor dispute. 
See MICHIGAN Comment, supra note 51, at 697. There, the author argues that consumers could 
be educated to recognize handbilling as a sign of a consumer product picket, and handbilling 
could thus become as effective as picketing. 
71 377 U.S. at 79 (Black, J., concurring). 
72 Id. 
73 See note 69 supra. 
74 United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93, 98 (1958). 
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did not make such a specific finding as to the legality of the union's 
object. As noted by Professor Lewis, the Court did not question the 
Board's finding that an object of the union was to force the secondary 
employer to cease doing business with the primary, an object that 
would be illegal.75 In finding the picketing "closely confined to the pri-
mary dispute,"76 however, the Court seemed to imply that picketing 
limited to the struck product is both a primary and legal object. Since 
the Court declared that the means employed were lawful, a specific 
finding of the legality of the object was unnecessary in Tree Fruits, be-
cause, if either the object or the means is lawful, there is no violation. 
The Court's failure to make a clear finding on the legality of the 
union's object, however, contributes to the confusion over the applica-
tion of Tree Fruits; the Board and courts have continued to utilize the 
means-object analysis in subsequent cases, and such a finding would 
have been instructive in those cases. 
APPLICATION OF TREE FRUITS TO SAFECO: THE APPROACH 
OF THE NLRB 
At first glance, the picketing in Sefeco seems to fit the definitions 
of both legal and illegal picketing as stated in Tree Fruits. The picket-
ing in Sefeco was limited to the product, which the Tree Fruits Court 
said would be lawful; yet, it was, as a practical matter, an appeal not to 
trade at all, which the Tree Fruits Court held would be unlawful. De-
spite this confusion, the basis of the distinction between lawful and un-
lawful picketing lends support to the en bane court's determination that 
the picketing was lawful. The Tree Fruits Court found that Congress 
did not intend to prohibit peaceful picketing limited to the struck prod-
uct because such picketing is "closely confined to the primary dispute." 
Such picketing is, in effect, primary picketing at the secondary site, 
since the union is not creating a dispute with the secondary employer. 
If the secondary ceases trading with the primary, the cessation results 
from a lack of demand for the product, not from coercion of the secon-
dary. Picketing becomes coercive, and therefore unlawful, only when it 
appeals for a boycott of products other than the struck product. 77 This 
rationale supports the en bane court's position in Sefeco. 
The Board, however, felt that the factual distinction between 
Sefeco and Tree Fruits was legally significant.78 It articulated its view 
most clearly in Local 14055, United Steelworkers (.Dow Chemical Co.),79 
a case on which it relied in Sefeco. In .Dow, the Board said that the 
75 Lewis, supra note 51, at 486. 
76 377 U.S. at 72. 
77 Id. 
78 226 N.L.R.B. at 757. 
79 211N.L.R.B.649, 651 (1974), eeforcement denied on other grounds, 524 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 
1975), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), dismissed as moot, 229 N.L.R.B. 302 (1977). 
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significance of the product to the secondary removed the picketing 
from the protection offered by Tree Fruits. Since Tree Fruits did not 
apply, the Board had to make an independent finding whether the 
NLRA prohibited picketing under such circumstances. The Board 
then applied means-object analysis and found the picketing unlawful. 
The Board in Safeco found that the picketing was designed to per-
suade customers not to patronize the secondary. The employer would 
then be forced to cease doing business with the primary because of the 
serious actual or potential economic loss. so Therefore, the Board found 
an unlawful object-a total boycott to force the neutral to cease doing 
business with the primary-and an unlawful means-coercion-bring-
ing the picketing within the statute's prescription. The Board read Tree 
Fruits to hold that the picketing at issue in that case did not threaten, 
restrain, or coerce the retailer because of the minimal impact. In addi-
tion, the Board concluded that it was the minimal impact of a success-
ful picket in Tree Fruits that militated against the inference of an 
unlawful object in that case.81 The predictably greater impact of the 
picketing on the secondaries in Safeco, however, warranted a different 
holding, according to the Board. 
THE COURT'S APPROACH: A BETTER BALANCE 
Although the Board's analysis is not unpersuasive, since potential 
economic injury may cause the secondary to cease doing business with 
the primary, there are several problems with the Board's approach. An 
analysis of these problems reveals that the court's approach is the pref-
erable interpretation of Tree Fruits and should be adopted by courts 
considering picketing similar to that in Safeco. 
The Predictable Impact Analysis 
The Board in Safeco focused on predictability of impact rather 
than on economic impact per se. Nevertheless, reliance on economic 
impact similar to that rejected in Tree Fruits is inherent in the Board's 
approach. Both the economic impact approach and the predictable im-
pact approach determine the legality of consumer picketing according 
to the actual or potential effects of picketing on the business of the sec-
ondary and the secondary's response to those effects. 
Although the Court in Tree Fruits mentioned the insignificant po-
tential impact of a successful boycott in that case, its decision that the 
80 The secondary in the Tree Fmits situation would also be forced to cease doing business with 
the primary as a result of successful picketing. The reason for the cessation of business is the 
distinguishing factor. In a Tree Fmits situation, the lack of demand for the product, rather than 
coercion, causes the cessation of business. See 2ll N.L.R.B. at 651. 
81 See Comment, Secondary Boycolls-Consumer Picketing-Strock Product as Major Source 
ef Re~enue, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 176 (1976); DETROIT Note, supra note 69, at 579. 
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picketing was not coercive was not based upon that factor. 82 In fact, 
the Tree Fruits majority specifically rejected an economic impact test 
for coercion. The Court stated: 
We disagree therefore with the Court of Appeals that the test of "to 
threaten, coerce or restrain" for the purposes of this case is whether 
Safeway suffered or was likely to suffer economic loss. A violation ef 
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) would not be established, merely because respondents' pick-
eting was ejfective to reduce Safeway's sales ef Washington State apples, 
even !f this led, or might lead Sefeway to drop the item as a poor seller.83 
In addition to the Supreme Court's explicit rejection of the eco-
nomic impact test of coercion in Tree Fruits,84 there are several other 
reasons to reject the Safeco Board's predictable impact approach. 
First, the predictable impact approach is inconsistent with the primary 
activity rationale of the Supreme Court in Tree Fruits. The Court 
found the picketing at issue in Tree Fruits to be primary in character 
because it was limited to the primary's product. It does not become less 
primary as the struck product increases as a percentage of the secon-
dary's business as in Safeco. In fact, as suggested by dissenting Board 
members in Dow, increasing economic interdependence between the 
primary and secondary has the opposite e.ff ect of increasing the primary 
nature of the picketing. 85 
Second, the Board has not used economic impact as a test of coer-
cion in other secondary boycott situations because it does not provide a 
useful standard. 86 The purpose of all picketing is to put pressure on the 
82 Local 14055, United Steelworkers (Dow Chem. Co.), 524 F.2d at 858, vacated and re-
manded, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), dismissed as moot, 229 N.L.R.B. 302 (1977). 
83 377 U.S. at 72-73 (emphasis added). 
84 Patrick Duerr suggests that the Supreme Court in Tree Fruits did not reject an economic 
injury test that would find picketing that causes substantial economic loss coercive. Duerr reads 
the Court as rejecting only a test that would find any economic impact coercive. Duerr, ])eve/op-
ing a Standard far Secondary Consumer Picketing, 26 LAB. L.J. 585 (1975). The language of the 
Court, however, is not limited to situations where the impact is minimal. The Court states that a 
violation would not be established even if the picketing caused reduced sales sufficient to lead 
Safeway to cease purchasing apples. 377 U.S. at 72-73. Duerr's interpretation is appropriate only 
if the decision is limited to a factual situation similar to Tree Fruits. 
In addition, Justice Harlan's dissent in Tree Fruits raised the problem of the secondary who 
sells predominantly the primary's product. He suggested that the Court's interpretation would 
permit picketing in such a situation. Id. at 83 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Although not conclusive, 
the majority's failure to repudiate such a construction supports the en bane court's interpretation. 
85 Local 14055, United Steelworkers (Dow Chem. Co.) 211 N.L.R.B. 649, 654-55 (Fanning 
and Jenkins, dissenting) (1974), eeforcement denied on other grounds, 524 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 
1975), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), dismissed as moot, 229 N.L.R.B. 302 (1977). 
According to Fanning and Jenkins, the more dependent the secondary is on the primary, the less 
neutral the secondary is in relationship to the primary's labor disputes. 
86 The Board and the courts have used effect to establish a violation only where the statute 
specifically requires it. See note 46 supra (quoting proviso to § 8(b)(4)). The proviso to 
§ 8(b )(7)(C) also bans picketing with a specific effect. The proviso states: 
Provided further, That nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any 
picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including con-
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primary employer. Secondary employers who deal with the primary 
will be affected by successful pressure on the primary. When a strike at 
the primary halts production, all purchasers of the primary's product, 
as well as suppliers of the primary, will be adversely affected. Yet, 
Congress specifically protected primary strikes. 87 
The third reason for rejecting the Board's predictable impact anal-
ysis is that it is based on questionable assumptions about the behavior 
of consumers· and neutral employers. The analysis assumes that cus-
tomers will refuse to patronize a business if pickets request a boycott of 
the predominant product. In fact, even casual observance demon-
strates that picket lines tum away few customers. Moreover, as the dis-
sent in .Dow noted, 88 the Court in Tree Fruits rejected the argument 
that picketing, even if limited to one product, should be banned merely 
because it might cause the public not to patronize a business. 89 Simi-
larly, the possibility that customers, when requested to boycott the ma-
jor product, may not patronize an establishment at all should not 
warrant a prohibition against picketing properly limited to the prod-
uct. 90 
Predicting the secondary's reaction to product picketing is as spec-
ulative as predicting the public's reaction. The secondary, faced with a 
boycott of a product that generates a substantial portion of the revenue 
of its business, may be forced to cease doing business with the primary 
because of the potential economic loss. 91 On the other hand, the sole or 
predominant product seller might find it more difficult to cease doing 
business because of the benefits, i.e., advertising, of being a sole prod-
uct seller and the difficulties of obtaining another supplier.92 An em-
ployer, such as the grocery store in Tree Fruits, may be more likely, 
because of the lack of importance of the product, to cease doing busi-
ness with the primary, than the employer selling predominantly the pri-
mary's product will be. The lack of predictability of the secondary's 
sumers) that an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor 
organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any individual employed by any 
otlier person in the course of his empfoyment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods 
or not to perform any services. 
29 u.s.c. § 159(b)(7){C)(l976). 
87 The proviso to§ 8(b)(4)(B) says: "Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall 
be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary 
picketing .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(b){4)(ii)(B) (1976). 
88 211 N.L.R.B. at 654 (Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting), eeforcement denied on other grounds, 
524 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), dismissed as moot, 229 
N.L.R.B. 302 (1977). 
89 377 U.S. at 71. 
90 See Duerr, supra note 84, at 589. 
91 Local 14055, United Steelworkers (Dow Chem. Co.), 211 N.L.R.B. 649, 651 (1974), enforce-
ment denied on other grounds, 524 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 807 
(1976), dismissed as moot, 229 N.L.R.B. 302 (1977). 
92 Duerr, supra note 84, at 590. 
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response makes any inference of coercion or unlawful object based on 
the predominance of the product seem speculative at best. 
The fourth reason the predictable impact standard is problematic 
is that it creates difficulties in line-drawing. It is not clear how signifi-
cant to the secondary the product must be in order to create an infer-
ence of an intent to seek a total boycott. Safeco policies constituted 
ninety to ninety-five percent of the business of the land title companies. 
One of the secondary employers in .Dow derived less than fifty percent 
of its revenues from the primary's product.93 In both situations, the 
Board found a violation. The only guidance the .Dow Board gave for 
drawing a line was the "predictability of such impact;"94 yet, the impact 
is certainly not as predictable as the Board implied.95 
Finally, the Board's construction is unacceptable because it predi-
cates the legality of the picketing on a factor outside the union's knowl-
edge and control: the percentage of the secondary's business 
attributable to the primary's product. The union may have little or no 
information on which to base a determination whether it can legally 
picket a retailer.96 Yet, it has an affirmative duty to conform its picket-
ing to legal requirements.97 Imposing such a burden without clear 
standards based on factors known to the union fosters frequent litiga-
tion. 
Clear standards are important for two reasons. First, they enable 
the union to picket only where lawful, and thus to avoid the risk of 
costly damage judgments,98 and, second, they enable the Board to 
make proper decisions about the legality of picketing on the basis of 
initial investigations. Section 10(1) of the NLRA requires the Board to 
seek an injunction in federal district court whenever it has reasonable 
cause to believe that there is a violation of, inter a!ia, section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(B).99 If the district court agrees with the Board's determina-
tion of reasonable cause, it will issue an injunction against the union 
that will remain in effect pending a final decision by the Board on the 
merits of the charge. Thus, the Board's initial decision regarding the 
93 Local 14055, United Steelworkers (Dow Chem. Co.), 524 F.2d 853, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1975), 
vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), dismissed as moot, 229 N.L.R.B. 302 (1977). 
94 211 N.L.R.B. at 652. See also Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001 (Safeco Title Ins. 
Co.), 226 N.L.R.B. 754, 757, rev'd, IOI L.R.R.M. 3084 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en bane). 
95 See text accompanying notes 87-91 supra. 
96 Local 14055, United Steelworkers (Dow Chem. Co.), 524 F.2d 853, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1975), 
vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), dismissed as moot, 229 N.L.R.B. 302 (1977). 
97 Millmen & Cabinet Makers Local 550, 227 N.L.R.B. 196 (1976). In Mil/men, the Board 
found that a union that picketed a secondary employer for two days with a sign requesting cus-
tomers not to patronize the secondary employer violated § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) even though they subse-
quently changed the sign. The Board held that the union had the burden of insuring that its 
appeal was limited to the primary product. 
98 Section 303 of the NLRA authorizes employers injured by unions violating§ 8(b)(4) to sue 
for damages. 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1976). 
99 Id. § 160(e) (1976). 
986 
74:970 (1980) Sqfeco Title Insurance Co. 
legality of the picketing determines whether the union can continue to 
picket, and therefore may determine the success of the union's eco-
nomic pressure on the employer. 100 The lack of clear standards will 
increase the likelihood of error in the determination whether reason-
able cause exists to believe a violation has occurred. Standards that 
enable the union to determine whether it can legally picket prior to 
actually picketing will also aid employers. If the union knows the pick-
et is illegal, employers will be spared any injury the picketing might 
cause to the extent that unions will decide not to picket unlawfully. 
The Primary-Secondary .Dichotomy 
The primary-secondary distinction utilized by the en bane court in 
Safeco has been criticized as confusing101 and as lacking a rationale 
generally applicable to all secondary boycott cases. 102 Although the 
primary-secondary analysis does not explain the results of all cases de-
cided under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), it is consistent with the approach of 
the Board and the courts in many areas of secondary activity. 103 
The primary-secondary approach is utilized in common situs pick-
eting104 and roving situs picketing105 cases. In these cases, the Board 
applies specific standards to decide whether the picketing is directed at 
the secondary employer, and thus whether the picketing is unlawful. 
These standards, articulated in Sailors' Union of the Pac!fic (Moore .Dry 
.Dock Co.), 106 include: (1) whether picketing is conducted at times 
when the primary is present at the site; (2) whether picketing takes 
place when the primary is engaged in normal business at the site; (3) 
whether picketing takes place reasonably close to the primary; and ( 4) 
whether signs clearly reflect that the dispute is with the primary not the 
100 Comment, Consumer Picketing: Reassessing the Concept of Employer Neutrality, 65 CALIF. 
L. REV. 172, 183 n.57 (1977) [hereinafter cited as CALIFORNIA Comment]. 
101 Comment, Primary v. Secondary Labor Boycolls: Is There a Rational Basis for the JJistinc-
tion? 22 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531 (1973). 
102 See Engel, supra note 39, at 198; CALIFORNIA Comment, supra note 100, at 180. 
103 Providing a standard of analysis applicable to all § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) cases would involve a 
major upheaval in many areas of settled law. Such an approach seems appropriate for legislative 
action rather than adjudication. 
104 Common situs cases involve situations where the primary employer and the secondary em-
ployer are located on the same work site. C. MORRIS, supra note 2, at 625. See NLRB v. Denver 
Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); Retail Fruit Clerks Union (Crystal Palace Market), 
116 N.L.R.B. 856 (1956), e'!fOrced, 249 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1957). The Board looks at various 
objective factors in common situs cases to determine whether a union picketing at the site violates 
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). C. MORRIS, supra note 2, at 626. 
105 In roving, or ambulatory situs cases, the situs of the primary dispute moves, stopping peri-
odically at the premises of secondary employers. C. MORRIS, supra note 2, at 625. In the typical 
example, the primary employs truck drivers who deliver to secondary employers. Brewery & Bev-
erage Drivers Local 67 (Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc.), 107 N.L.R.B. 299 (1953), 
e'!fOrced, 220 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1955); International Bhd. of Teamsters (Schultz Refrigerated 
Serv. Inc.), 87 N.L.R.B. 502 (1949). 
106 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950). 
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secondary. The Supreme Court approved the application of similar 
standards to common situs picketing in NLRB v . .Denver Building 
Trades Council. 107 In roving situs and common situs cases, economic 
harm to the secondary is irrelevant if the manner and circumstances of 
the picketing and other evidence of the union's object, ie., statements 
of union officials, do not indicate that the union is attempting to coerce 
the secondary to cease doing business with the primary. 108 
Modifying these standards to fit the product picketing situation 
and applying them to the union's actions in Safeco demonstrates that a 
primary object existed there. First, the union in Safeco picketed when 
the primary's product was present at the site. Second, the picketing 
took place when the product was being sold as a part of normal busi-
ness. Third, the union picketed at a location that appeared reasonably 
calculated to reach potential consumers rather than the secondary's 
employees or suppliers. Fourth, the picket signs clearly identified the 
primary employer as the employer with whom the union had a dis-
pute.109 Tree Fruits adds a fifth criterion, also met in Safeco: the pick-
eting was limited to appeals to boycott the primary's product and did 
not include other products that would create a separate dispute with the 
secondary. 110 
Electrical Workers Local 61 v. NLRB (General Electric) 111 is a var-
iation on the typical common situs picketing case in which the primary-
secondary test was used to assess the legality of picketing. General 
Electric operated a manufacturing facility at which it set up a separate 
gate or entrance for employees of the various contractors working at 
the site. 112 The General Electric plant employees struck and picketed 
all entrances including the one reserved for the employees of the in-
dependent contractors. The Supreme Court held that the statute did 
not bar picketing of the separate gate unless the employees of the in-
dependent contractors were performing work unrelated to the normal 
operations of the primary employer. 113 Although the Court recognized 
an intent to force the secondary to cease doing business with the pri-
mary, it found that the picketing was sufficiently primary in character 
107 341 U.S. 675 (1951). 
108 National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 627 (1967). 
109 The picket signs read: SAFECO NONUNION DOES NOT EMPLOY MEMBERS OF 
OR HAVE CONTRACT WITH RETAIL STORE EMPLOYEES LOCAL 1001. 
110 See CALIFORNIA Comment, supra note 100, at 185-86, which argues that the standards do 
not lend themselves to application in consumer product picketing cases. 
111 366 U.S. 667 (1961). 
112 The contractors using the gate included construction contractors erecting new buildings, 
contractors installing and repairing heating and air conditioning equipment, contractors retooling 
machines, and general maintenance contractors. The original purpose of the separate gate was to 
insulate General Electric from the labor disputes of the contractors. 
113 366 U.S. at 682. 
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and not unlawful. 114 The character of the picketing depended on the 
nature of the relationship between the work of the primary and that of 
the secondary, not on the extent of the impact of the picketing on the 
secondary. 115 An independent contractor doing business only, with 
General Electric would be in a similar position to the secondary em-
ployers in Safeco, yet the General Electric Court did not consider the 
extent of the impact of the picketing. The rationale of General Electric 
accords with that of the en bane court in Safeco and provides support 
for that decision.116 
Work preservation picketing also provides an example of the pri-
mary-secondary distinction. In National Woodwork Manufacturers As-
sociation v. NLRB, 117 a union refused to handle prefitted doors 
purchased by the employer for installation in buildings under construc-
tion. The Court held that although compliance with the union's de-
mands would result in the contractor ceasing to do business with the 
supplier of the doors, the union's object was actually primary-preserv-
ing the work of fitting the doors for their members-rather than secon-
dary-putting economic pressure directly on their employer to force 
the employer to cease doing business with the primary. 118 The eco-
nomic action in National Woodwork took place at the primary's prem-
ises and consisted of refusals to install doors rather than picketing. 
Therefore, the action was less likely to injure the secondary employer 
than picketing might have been. 119 Nevertheless, the decision supports 
the rationale that picketing or other economic action may have the pre-
dictable effect of forcing an employer to cease doing business with an-
other employer but still remain sufficiently directed at the primary so 
that the statute is not violated. 120 
114 Id. at 673-74. 
115 Id at 680-81. 
116 Although General Electric dealt with § 8(b)(4)(i)(B), the rationale also applies to 
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), since the only difference in the two provisions is in the means considered unlaw-
ful. 
117 386 U.S. 612 (1967). See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB, 102 L.R.R.M. 2361 
(D.C. Cir. 1979), for a recent decision involving work preservation picketing. 
118 The case required the Court to decide who was the primary employer in order to determine 
whether the object was primary or secondary. The Court concluded that the contractor was the 
primary since his employees were seeking to preserve their own work. It found that the door 
manufacturer was not the primary and that the dispute was not with that employer because the 
doors were not produced by union members. 386 U.S. at 644-46. 
119 It has been frequently recognized that picketing has an effect beyond the message conveyed. 
Some people may avoid locations with pickets because of their reluctance to confront a picket line 
regardless of whether they support the cause of the picketers. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers 
Local 700 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 71 (1964); Building Serv. Employees Local 262 v. Gazzam, 
339 U.S. 532, 537 (1950). 
120 The Court also noted in reviewing prior secondary boycott cases that "however severe the 
impact of primary activity on neutral employers, it was not thereby transformed into activity with 
a secondary objective." 386 U.S. at 627. 
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Both the Safeco panel 121 and dissent to the en bane opinion 122 rely 
on the integrated product cases123 to support their conclusion that the 
picketing in Safeco was unlawful. The integrated product cases base 
the determination of illegality on the predictable result of product pick-
eting-a total boycott. These cases, however, are distinguishable. Un-
like the product in Safeco, the primary's product in the integrated 
product cases is an inseparable part of the secondary's product so that it 
is impossible to boycott the primary's product without expanding the 
dispute to include other products and, in most cases, the entire business 
of the secondary. The union necessarily broadens its dispute beyond 
the product to affect truly neutral aspects of the secondary's business. 124 
Since the proposed boycott in Safeco was aimed only at the primary's 
product, however, no part of the secondary's business unrelated to the 
primary would have been affected. Moreover, predicting the impact of 
integrated products picketing is less speculative than in Safeco, since it 
is impossible to boycott only the primary product. For example, in Ce-
ment Masons Union Local 337, 125 the union picketed a subdivision 
sales office, requesting customers not to buy houses, to further a dispute 
with the general contractor who had constructed the houses. The 
Board found the picketing violative of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), and the 
court affirmed the decision. In that case, if consumers responded to the 
picket at all, the dispute was necessarily expanded beyond the primary, 
the general contractor, to affect all subcontractors who participated in 
the construction. Although the developer may derive some benefit 
from the wages and working conditions of the primary employees, any 
benefits the subcontractors derive are significantly less direct. There-
fore, the subcontractors are clearly the type of neutrals Congress in-
tended section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to protect. In Safeco, the title insurance 
companies benefited directly from the wages and working conditions of 
the Safeco employees. In addition, the picketing had no direct effect on 
other more neutral employers. The title insurance companies are there-
fore less entitled to protection than secondaries in integrated products 
cases. 126 
Policies Underlying The Secondary Boycott Ban 
The secondary boycott provisions of the NLRA have a dual pur-
pose: to protect neutrals from labor disputes that do not concern them 
and to permit unions to communicate the facts of their labor disputes to 
121 99 L.R.R.M. at 3334. 
122 Safeco Title Ins., 101 L.R.R.M. at 1095-96 (Robb, J., dissenting). 
123 See note 28 supra. 
124 See Safeco Title Ins., 101 L.R.R.M. at 3092-93 n.93. 
125 190 N.L.R.B. 261 (1971), eeforced, 468 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 
(1973). 
126 See text accompanying notes 128-33 i'!fra. 
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the public. 127 The en bane court's decision in Safeco accommodates 
these two puposes. 
Protection of Nf!utrals.-Protection of neutrals has been empha-
sized as an objective of the secondary boycott provisions of the_NLRA, 
perhaps because it was the motivating factor for the 1959 amendments. 
An interpretation of congressional intent, however, necessarily encom-
passes more than a determination of the motivating factor for the legis-
lation. The Board's economic impact approach emphasizes the 
protection of neutrals at the expense of protecting the union's right to 
communicate, the other objective of the statute. But injury to a neutral 
is not, in and of itself, objectionable since activity that is legally permis-
sible frequently harms neutrals. 128 Therefore, a test based solely on the 
protection of neutrals cannot provide a workable standard for deter-
mining legality. 129 
In addition, as the dissent from the Board's Safeco decision noted, 
sole or predominant product sellers may not be the type of employers 
that Congress intended to protect by enacting the statute. The dissent 
referred to the title insurance companies as "hardly the neutral employ-
ers our colleagues consider them." 130 The reasoning behind this :find-
ing is explained in their .Dow dissent. The dissent there suggested that 
the "statutory concept of neutrality tends to lose its substance as the 
struck goods rise toward being the sole or nearly sole product handled 
127 National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 626-27 (1967). 
128 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Plumbers Local 638 v. NLRB, 521 
F.2d 885, 900 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 507 (1977), quotes with approval a statement 
to this effect from Tower, A Perspective on Secondary Boycotts, 2 LAB. L.J. 727, 732 (1951). 
129 CALIFORNIA Comment, supra note 100, at 183. 
130 Retail Store Employees Local 1001, 226 N.L.R.B. 754, 758 (1976) (Fanning and Jenkins, 
dissenting), rev'd, IOI L.R.R.M. 3084 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en bane). In support of the argument that 
Congress intended to protect sole product sellers, the Safeco panel cited a statement made by 
Senator McClellan in the congressional debates in support of the amendments to § 8(b)(4). 99 
L.R.R.M. at 3333. Senator McClellan stated: 
I point out that we have cases of merchants who for 20 years, IO years, or for a long period of 
time, may have been handling a particular brand of product. A merchant may have built his 
business around the product, such as the John Deere plows or some kind of machinery from 
some other company. The merchant may have built up his trade entirely on that product. 
I05 CONG. REc. 6667 (1959). The en bane dissent also relied on Senator McClellan's statement 
for support. Safeco Title Ins., IOI L.R.R.M. at 3095 (Robb, J., dissenting). The remainder of 
Senator McClellan's statement, however, indicates that his concern was with general economic 
pressure on the secondary rather than a consumer product boycott. 99 L.R.R.M. at 3339 n.42 
(Robinson, J., dissenting). Senator McClellan went on to say: 
The Union may say to the merchant, "You cannot sell this product. If you do we will picket 
your place of business. Thus you will not be able to get your supplies, because the Teamsters 
will not cross the picket line." 
In addition, the merchant's customers would be embarrassed. They would be harassed. 
They would see the picket sign. What would the sign say? It would say "Unfair to labor." 
How is the merchant unfair to labor? It is simply a case of the merchant not being willing to 
stop handling a product which he has been handling for 20 years and on which he has built 
his business. That is a secondary boycott which, it seems to me, ought- to be prohibited. 
I05 CONG. REc. 6667 (1959). 
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by the retailer." 131 The dissent implies that the relationship inherent in 
such economic interdependence warrants less protection of the secon-
dary. 
One commentator has proposed a reevaluation of the standards 
for determining employer neutrality to solve the problems posed by 
consumer product picketing cases.132 The argument has much appeal 
since the suggested changes could be accomplished by adjudication and 
would apply to all secondary boycott situations. For the present, how-
ever, the law on neutrality is well-settled and an evaluation of the 
Safeco decision is limited by prior case law. 133 Nevertheless, in light of 
the questionable neutrality of the secondary employers, the balance 
struck by the en bane court permitting limited picketing of predomi-
nant product sellers seems particularly appropriate. 
Protection of the Union's Right to Appeal to Consumers.-The sec-
ond objective of the secondary boycott provisions of the NLRA is pro-
tection of the union's right to appeal to <;:onsumers for support of their 
labor disputes. 134 A prohibition on picketing of secondaries whose 
business is comprised largely of the primary's product deprives the 
union of its most effective and efficient means of informing the public 
about a labor dispute. Nothing in the NLRA requires the union to 
choose the least disruptive means of publicizing a dispute. That would 
be clearly contrary to the union's interest. Arguably, the Supreme 
Court in Tree Fruits struck a balance between the two objectives when 
it decided that picketing of struck products was permissible; the harm 
to the neutral that might result from such picketing did not outweigh 
the union's right to publicize its dispute. 135 The en bane court in 
Sefeco struck the same balance, protecting neutrals from involvement 
131 Local 14055, United Steelworkers (Dow Chem. Co.), 211 N.L.R.B. 649, 654-55 (1974) (Fan-
ning and Jenkins, dissenting), e'!forcement denied on other grounds, 524 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975), 
vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), dismissed as moot, 229 N.L.R.B. 302 (1977). See also 
Bennett v. Teamsters & Chauffeurs Local 456, 459 F. Supp. 223, 232 n.19 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Ben· 
nell suggests that it is illogical to treat the factor of economic interdependence as requiring protec-
tion of the secondary in consumer picketing cases but, at the same time, allowing picketing in 
situations where the economic interdependence contributes to a finding of an ally relationship 
between the employers. For an explanation of ally relationships, see note 25 supra. 
132 CALIFORNIA Comment, note 100 supra. There, the author suggests that the legality of con-
sumer picketing be determined by the degree of interrelationship of the producer and the retailer 
as measured by the standards used for ascertaining whether an ally relationship exists. This ap-
proach has the advantage of protecting the most neutral employers but creates problems of line-
drawing in cases where the relationship is neither very close nor very distant. 
133 The majority and the dissent in both the Board and the court decisions agreed that under 
existing law, the title insurance companies are neutral. Although there is some room for argu-
ment, the courts have generally deferred to the Board's findings on neutrality issues if they are 
supported by substantial evidence. See note 29 supra. 
134 NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951). 
135 Local 14055, United Steelworkers (Dow Chem. Co.), 524 F.2d 853, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1975), 
vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), dismissed as moot, 229 N.L.R.B. 302 (1977). 
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in disputes that extend beyond their business with the primary em-
ployer while, at the same time, permitting unions to pressure the pri-
mary employer with publicity directed at the primary. 
The Realities of Modern Industrial Relations.-The en bane court's 
balance between the dual objectives of the secondary boycott provi-
sions of the NLRA is especially appropriate in view of the complexity 
of modem industrial relations. Business relationships today are sub-
stantially more complex than even twenty years ago, the date of the 
passage of the secondary boycott amendments. Businesses are fre-
quently part of large conglomerates and have substantial resources to 
resist economic pressure brought by unions. Furthermore, many indus-
tries have become increasingly vertically integrated.136 There may be 
highly interdependent relationships, and even common ownership of 
producers, distributors, and retailers, that meet the Board's tests of neu-
trality.137 The existence of highly integrated businesses increases the 
difficulty of affecting wages and working conditions.138 The California 
legislature considered this factor when it specifically permitted con-
sumer picketing of product ingredients, as well as products, in its Agri-
cultural Labor Relations Act.139 
Also, the location of work sites often complicates efforts to publi-
cize labor disputes. The majority of work sites are located in places not 
frequented by the public-in industrial parks, in central cities, or along 
rural highways. Effective publicity may be possible only at retail out-
lets for the employer's products. 
The NLRA was originally passed to promote peaceful, private res-
olution of labor disputes by correcting the imbalance in power between 
labor and management.140 Subsequent amendments have attempted to 
maintain a balance of power. 141 Recognition of the changing nature of 
modem business in interpreting the secondary boycott provisions of the 
NLRA is consistent with this policy. That balance is accomplished in 
Safeco. 
CONCLUSION 
The en bane court's opinion in Safeco, permitting picketing of the 
secondary employer limited to the primary's product regardless of the 
136 For a discussion of the extent of integration in the agriculture industry, see CALIFORNIA 
Comment, supra note 100, at 211-12. 
137 See note 25 supra. 
138 CALIFORNIA Comment, supra note 100, at 212. 
139 Id. at 215. 
140 II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 3269-70 (1935) (state-
ment of President Roosevelt as to purpose of bill). 
141 I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT l (1947); II id. at 
1654-55; I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE 
ACT l (1959). 
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significance of that product to the secondary, is consistent with the pri-
mary-secondary rationale used by the Court in Tree Fruits and with the 
Board's standards in other types of secondary boycott cases. To deter-
mine whether the picketing of a secondary is coercive and has an un-
lawful object, the Board must determine whether the appeal goes 
beyond the struck product. To make this determination, rhe Board 
should look at objective factors similar to those considered in other 
types of secondary boycott cases: (1) the wording on the sign; (2) the 
location of the pickets; (3) the timing of the picketing; and ( 4) any con-
versations of the pickets with consumers, employees, or the secondary 
employer that might belie the ostensible object. 142 Although the per-
centage of the secondary's business that the primary product constitutes 
is also an objective, easily discernible factor, the Board decision in 
Safeco not to permit picketing if the "predictable result" is a total boy-
cott offers little guidance regarding the percentage that warrants finding 
such a violation. Moreover, the decision is based on questionable as-
sumptions about the predictability of the response of consumers and 
secondaries to a picket. 
The standard enunciated by the en bane Safeco court enables all 
parties to a dispute to predict more closely the outcome of a charge 
alleging a violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). It is easier for a union to 
conform its picketing to legal requirements since they are not based on 
factors over which it has no control or about which it has little informa-
tion.143 Employers will also be better able to determine whether an 
appeal is within the limits on consumer picketing. Clear, objective 
standards should limit the number of charges filed to those where a 
violation at least arguably occurred. 
Finally, the court's decision provides an administratively workable 
standard for consumer product picketing that takes into account the 
changing nature and increasing complexity of business and industrial 
relations. The standard effectuates both purposes of the secondary 
boycott provisions of the NLRA-protection of neutrals and protection 
of the right of unions to solicit support in labor disputes-as well as the 
basic purpose of the NLRA as a whole-encouraging free collective 
bargaining and peaceful, private resolution of labor disputes. 
Ann Hodges 
142 See Sailors' Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950). 
143 See note 96 and accompanying text supra. 
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